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A corporation is regarded as a nere creature of
the law, created for the acconplishnent of the objects
specified in its charter, and having no powers, except
such as are expressly granted, or are incidental to its
very existance. When the law creates a corporation it
does so with the contemplation that it will remain sol-
vent; but experience has shown to us that this most de-
sirable condition can not always be maintained. The re-
sult is that the corporation becomes insolvent, and then
a new state of things commences, unforseen and unprovided
for, by the charter of its creation; and a new rule for
the government of its agents, neccessaril comes into
existance, by operation of law.
The corporation is rendered, by its insolvency,
incapable of persuing the object for which it was created
without perpetrating a fraud upon the public generally
and also upon its existing creditors.
After insolvency the corporation is restrained
from exercising its corporate franchise because it would
be an abuse of its powers and privilages conferred by its
charter. The question that at once confronts us is, what
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are the duties of the corporation and its agents in re-
gard to the property remaining under their control; and
in what manner it is t6 be applied? In the abscence of
any positive law upon the question the rule would be to
dispose of it according to the principles of natural
justice and equity.
Since a corporation can be brought into existance
only by virtue of some special act or general law, its
dissolution is in like manner governed by certain legal
principles.
At an early day it becomes customary for a corpor-
ation which was unable to meet its obligations, and when
it saw that failure was imminent to assign all its assets
to some particular individual to hold in trust for its
corporate creditors.
In this connection we will first consider the
right of a corporation to make an assignment.
At com. law and in the abscence of thatthere is
but little question that the lattitude given to corpora-
tions in this respect is as broad as that allowed to pri-
vate individuals. "A corporate body,4s well as a private
individual", observer Chancellor Kent in his commentaries,
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(2 Kent's com. p.398 (10 th sec.)) "when in failing cir-
cumstances and unable to redeem its paper, may without
any statute provision, and upon general principles of
equity, assign its property to a trustee, in trust to
collect its debts and pay debts and distribute as direct-
ed. It has unlimited power over its property to pay its
debts." And it may be said to be settled by thew-right of
authority, that a corporation has a right to make an as-
signment in trust for its creditors; and may exercise
that right to the same extent and in the same manner as a
natural person, unless restricted by its charter or some
statutory provision.
The reports throughout the different jurisdictions
are filled with cases in support of this general rule.
In Hoxtun v. Bishop 3 Wend. 13, which came before
the supreme court of this state, in 1829, an insolvent
bank made a general assignment of all its property, in
trust to sell the same, and apply the proceeds to the
payment of all the creditors of the bank ratably. And
chief justice Savage held that the assignment was valid.
A leading case in this country is that of DeRuyter
v St. Peter's Church (3 Barb. Ch. 119) decided by Chan-
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cellor Walworth in 1848, and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals (3 N.Y. 238). By an act of the legislature of New
York the trustees of St. Peter's Church were authorizel
to dispose of the real and personal estate of the corpor-
ation for the benefit and advantage of the church and
congregation, with the concurrence of the chancellor's
firstI4 V,}'es(,in the manner specified by the act for the
incorporation of religious societies. The trustees of the
corporation executed an assignment of all its property,
real and personal, to assignees for the payment of all
debts ratably-- a petition being presented to the vice-
chancellor, and an order obtained authorizing such assign-
ment. The case turned upon the validity of this assign-
ment and it will thus be observed that the direct ques-
tion involved was dependent somewhat upon the statutory
authority to which reference has been made. Chancellor
Walworth, however, discusses the question upon general
principles, as well as affected by the statute in ques-
tion.
"It appears," he says, "to be settled by weight of
authority which is irresistable that a corporation has a
right to make an assignment, for its creditors, and may
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exercise that right to the same extent, and in the sane
manner, as a natural person, unless restricted by its
charter or by some statutory provision."
This doctrine is so firmly implanted in American
Jurisprudence, that it needs no further citations of au-
thorities for its support.
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In like manner a corporation has, in the absence
of a statutory prohibition, the same power of making pref-
erences among its creditors, in the distribution of its
assets, as an individual.
This point has repeatedly been decided by the
courts throughout the different jurisdictions; and an
assignment made by a corporation of all its assets to a
trustee, to pay certain creditors in full, leaving the
others unpaid, will be sustained both at law and in equi-
ty. An interesting case upon this point is that of Ringo
v Biseoe 13 Ark. 563 in which it was said by Chief Jus-
tice Watkins in the course of his opinion, that; "It is
now well settled thata corporation, unless restricted by
its charter, or prevented by the operation of smine bank-
rupt or insolvent law, by virtue of its general power to
contract, may well make an assignment of its effects, en-
tire,or partial, is made bona fide for the payment of its
debts, the same as any natural person may be, and the
corporation has the same right to make preferences among
its creditors of particular creditor or classes of cred-
itors; and such preferences, when they are meritorious
-7-
so far from furnishing an argunent against the deed,
conduce rather to uphold it."
In this state in the recent case of Coats v Don-
nell 94 N.Y. 168 it was held by J. Andrews that a corpor-
ation, in the absence of statutory restrictions, has the
right to prefer one creditor to another on the distribu-
tion of its property.
Although the above doctrine is recognized both in
courts of law and of equity. still it can not be defended
upon the ground of principle. From the very nature of the
rule itself, it is seen that an injustice is worked
against those creditors who are unpreferred. Now if a
corporation is allowed to make a preference in favor of a
few of its creditots, how are the claims of the remainder
going to be satisfied? There is only a myth or shadow
left to which resort can be had for payment of their
claims; a soulless, fictitious, unsubstantial entity that
can be neither seen nor found. The capital and assets of
the corporation, the creditors trust fund, may, under
this rule, be carved out and apportioned among a chosen
few, usually the family connections or some particular
friends of the officers making the preference.
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We will show that the allowance of preferences is
contrary to the first principles of corporation law.
It is a principle of corporation law which is
fundamental, that the assets of an incorporated company
are regarded as a trust fund for the benefit of creditors.
This doctrine is of modern date and, it is believed, was
invented or brought conspicuously to Yhe notice of the
profession by Judge Story in the case of Wood v Dummer
3 Mason 308; it is, however, considered the most import-
ant principle applicable to the law of corporations. By
a careful examination of the cases it will be seen that
this rule is constanti stuuggling for recognition. This
rule regards the funds of a corporation as pledged ex-
clusively for the payments of its debts. Since the pri-
vate property of the stockholders is not liable, and
since in the absence of statute there is no individual
responsibility on the part directors for corporate obli-
gations; the corporate property is therefore the only
source to which the creditors can resort.
The assets, as we have seen, might properly be
considered as a special fund or property, set apart in
law, in lieu of the private property of the corporators,
-9-
to which resort may be had for the payment of the debts
of the corporation. It was said by Hunt J. in Upton v
Tribilcock 91 U.q. 45 that "The capital stock of a monied
corporation is a fund for the payment of its debts. It is
a trust fund, of which the directors are trustees. It is
a trust to be managed for the benefit of its shareholders
during its life, and for the benefit of its creditors in
the event of its dissolution. This duty is a sacred one,
and can not be dieregarded. Its violation will not be
undertaken by any just minded man, and will not be per-
mitted by the courts." This rule was denied in the case
of Cotlin v Eagle Bank 6 Conn. 233, but that case is at
variance with the whole theory of the law concerning the
rights of creditors of insolvent corporations, and is
contrary to the plainest principles of justice.
Now regarding this rule as well settled we will
consider it in connection with another which is equally
just and equitable.
The rule that hhe creditors are entitled to a pro
rata distribution of the assets of an insolvent corpor-
ation. This rule is based upon the equitable maxim,
"Equality is Equity."
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A careful study of these principles will clearly
show the pernicious character and the evil results which
flow from the practical application of this doctrine.
There has been a constant struggle both in the
cases and in the statutes to suppress freferences. the
results accomplished by the statutes of this state will
be considered in a later chapter of this article.
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The Common law rule in regard to assignments was
modified somewhat by statutes passed during the reign of
Elizabeth, restraining alienations of church property by
religious corporations; these statutes, forming a part of
the law of Eng. at the time of the settlement of this
state by colonists from Eng. under the charter of the
Duke of York, were probably brought here by those emi-
grants, and became a part of the laws of the colony;
although it seems that they were not afterwards re-enact-
ed here. For it is only natural to presume, that on the
settlement of a new territory by a colony from another
country, they carry with them the general laws of that
country, so far as those laws are applicable to the colon-
ists in their new situation.
That there was an unwritten law in this state,
restraining religious corporations from alienating church
property is evident from the fact that in March, 1806,the
legislature thought it neccessary to pass a special stat-
ute, authorizing the chancellor, upon the petition of the
corporation, to make an order for such sale, and for the
application of the proceeds thereof to such uses as the
-12-
corporation, with his assent, should conceive to be anost
for the interests of the society to which the property so
sold did previously belong.
4 W. & S. Laws, 360.
This provision was embodied in the general act of
1813 for the incorporation of religious socities.
3 R.S. 298 sec. 11.
A construction of this statute was soon called
forth by the case of De Ruyter v the Trustees of St.
Peter's Church and it was then held that under the sanc-
tion of an order of the court of Chancery, the corpora-
tion had power to make an assignment of all its real es-
tate, to trustees, in trust for the payment of all the
creditors of the corp. ratably.
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There are however cases in which it is contended
and also some instances successfully, that a general
assigunent of corporate property, since it practically
works a dissolution of the corporation, is an act outside
of the corporate powers of the officers of the company.
Some of the lower courts in the state of New York
lay down this rule. In the famous rubber case of Abbott
v Am. Hard Rubber Co. 33 Barb. 578. Sutherland J. in the
course of his opinion said,"That directors of a corpor-
ation are agents of the corporation to manage its affairs
and carry out the purpose and object of its formation,
and not to inflict upon it political death. They are only
authorized to do such things as are directly or impliedly
directed or authorized or authorized by the charter. When
the acts are inconsistent with the object and purpose for
which the body corporate was organized, they are void. In
this case it seems that the Def's.who are a majority of
the corp. made a general assignment of all the property
of the corporation without the consent and against the
wishes of Plf.. Plaintiff now brings an action to have
this sale set aside as fraudulent and void; for an injunc-
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tion to restrain the defendants from intermeddling with
the property so transferred; and for a receiver to take
possession thereof, under the direction of the ct. It wa3
held that the sale could not be permitted to stand; that
the transfer was made without power in the directors or
trustees and was a violation of the trust and confidence
reposed in theinand that Plf. was entitled to an injunc-
tion restraining the Def't. from interfering with the
property so transferred, and to a receiver to take pos-
session thereof."
In BeastomvTheFanners' Bank of Delaware, 12 Yet.
102, grave doubts as to the correctness of this principle
"that a corporation has a right to make an assignment,
in trust, for its creditors", were expressed by no less
an authority than Mr. Justice Story. the case arose upon
the construction of an act of congress providing that,
when any person indebted to the United States should be-
come insolvent, the debt due to the U.S. should be first
satisfied; and that the priority thus established should
be deemed to extend as well to cases in which a debtor,
not having sufficient property to pay all his debts,
should make a volentary assignment thereof, as4n other
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cases enumerated, And one of the questions presented to
the court was whether a corporation was a person within
the meaning of the act, and hence capable of assigning
for the benefit of its creditors. Itory dissented from
the decision of the cuurt, in one of his luminous opin-
ions which sometimes shed as much of the light of clear
judicial reasoning upon the subject under discussion as
the orinion of the majority of the court. He says: "I
must say that, independent of some special and positive
law or provision in its charter to such an effect, I do
exceedingly doubt if any corporation, at least without
the express assent of all the corporators, can rightfully
dispose of all its property by such a general assignment
so as to render itself incapable in future of performing
any of its functions. That would be to say that the major-
ity of a corporation had a right to extinguish the corpor-
ation by its own will and at its own pleasure. I doubt
that right, at least unless under very special circum-
stances."
The arguments very properly advanced to support
that case were, that any transfer of the corporate assets
made by the directors, which would necessitate a discon-
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tinuance or complete change of the business of the cor-
poration, w~uld not be tolerated without the assent of
the stockholders. And it must be conceded that upon the
facts as thay appear in that case these arguments are
both sound and logical; but it is to be noticed that the
case involved the question of the right of a corporation
acting by its directors to make a sale of practically its
entire plant and property, and was not the case of an
assignment by an involved corporation for the benefit of
creditors. So that the case can scarcely be regarded as
an authority against the rights of an involved corpora-
tion to make an assignment in trust for the benefit of
creditors, when all the assets are required for the pay-
ments of debts.
From the very nature of a corporation it is seen
that it must neccessairly act by agents who are the di-
rectors or trustees- As the general management of all
affairs relating to the corporation, and the disposition
and use of corporate assets, is necessairly intrusted
to the directors or trustees, there is no reason why they
should not also be considered as vested with the discre-
tion to determine the necessity for making a general
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assignment, and clothed with the power to carry out their
conclusion. Since the directors of a corporation are in
such a position as to command a broader knowledge of the
details of the business, their knowledge of the exigency
in the corporate affairs inducing the act is manifestly
more complete than that of stockholders or creditors. It
seems clear that creditors have no such interest in cor-
porate affairs as confers upon them the right to interfere
with corporate assignments for the benefit of creditors
when no fraud is practiced upon them. And as to stockhold-
ers, they have given the management of the affairs of the
association to the managing agents, who ought to be em-
powered to act according to their beat judgment in any
crisis that demands the prompt appropriation of corporate
assets to the payment of debts. It is evident that if the
corporation owes a debt, it must be paid. It is certainly
the duty of the trustees to pay the corporate debts and
to apply the corporate property to this end, although it
should exhaust it; and if that is to destroy the corpor-
ation, such result can not be avoided. A corporation can
no more avoid the payment of its debts than an individual
can evade his honest obligations: The individual must
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apply his property to satisfy the just demands of his
creditors until they are exhausted, although the result
be the destruction of his business and his impoverishment.
There is no more reason in favoring a corporation more
than an individual in this respect and it may be said
generally that the better opinion and the one sustained
by the weight of authority, is that an assignment of all
the corporate property does not effect the corporate
franchise and does not dissolve the corporation.
In Hulbert v Carter 21 Barb. 221, it was held that
it did not follow because a corporation can make a volun-
tary assignment, that it can transfer the power of its
officers to the assignee or surrender its franchise.
This doctrine was followed in State v Bk. of Md.
6 Gill & J. 205 and in Ringo v Real estate Bank 13 Ark.
563, and in many other states.
Now admitting the above to be the true rule there
is, it seems to me an aparent, if not real, absurdity
growing out of this doctrine.
While asserting the right of a corporation to thus
divest itself of everything pertaining to the nature of
property, and to denude itself of every element necessary
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to its continued operation, the courts have jealously in-
sisted upon the retention of the franchise, holding that
to be capable of surrender only by the action of the
courts, or by consent of the legislature which granted it.
Thus in state v Bank of Md. the courts insisted
that, although a corporation should, by a transfer of all
its property, render itself powerless to discharge the
ordinary purposes for which it was created, it still re-
mains an entity-- a living corporation.
So in Town v Bank of River Raisin, 2 Dougl.(Mich.)
530 it is held that the transfer or assignment of its
property does not necessairly,dissolve the corporation,
and is not a surrender of its franchise, but affords, at
the most, only ground for forfeiture by reason of misuser
or non-user.
And the same distinction runs through most of the
decisions which assert the right of a corporation to di-
vest itself of all its property by means of a general
assignment for the benefit of creditors.
Perhaps this distinction is based upon that funda-
mental American idea that the charter, when accepted,
becomes a contract between the state and the corporation.
At any rate while the distinction is well taken in point
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of law, it is a distinction without difference. The sub-
stance is taken, the shell is left. The naked franchise
alone remains--- The right to do corporate business under
a corporate name. Denuded of every agency through which a
corporation can operate, the phantom corporation still
lives, a sort of ignis fatuus.
The absurdity of such a distinction can be seen in
the fact that the act of the corporation in thus assign-
ing all its property is upheld by the courts as a valid
assignment, while the non-user of the franchise, which
necessairly follows when it is deprived of all the agen-
cies through which alone it can be exercised, results in
a judgement of forfeiture in proceedings in gno warranto.
The samne act is held to be legal and illegal at one and
the same time.
This is a good illustration of judicial hair split-
ting frequently met with in corporation law.
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Although it is almost universally held that a cor-
poration, in the absence of statute, has the right to
make both an assignment and a preference, still there are
few jurisdictions in which this right is not limited and
modified by statutory enactments. Since we could not pre-
tend to discuss , in a treatise of this nature, the sta-
tutory changes of this law throughout the different
states, special reference will therefore be had to the
statutes and decisions of New York.
An act was passed in this state April 21, 1825
2 R.S. (7th. ed.) p. 1534 see: 4.which was to the effect
that (whenever any incorporated company shall have re-
fused the payment of any of its notes, or other evidences
of debt, in specie, or lawful momey of the United States,
it shall not be lawful for such company, or any of its
officers, to assign or transfer any of the property or
shares in action of such company, to any officer or stock
holder of such company, directly or indirectly for the
payment of any debt; and it shall not be lawful to make
any transfer or assignment in contemplation of the in-
solvency of such company, to any person or persons what-
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ever; and every such transfer and assiginent to such
officer, stockholder or other' person, or in trust for
them or their benefit, shal] be utterly void." All pref-
erences were prohibited.
In 1829 a construction of the statute was called
forth by the case of Hoxtun v Bishop 3 Wend. 13. In this
case an assignment was assailed as being void under this
statute. But the Supreme Court held that, as it was not
an assignment "to any officer or stockholder for the pay-
ment of any debt"of theirs, nor an assignment to any one
"in contemplation of insolvency," within theyWeLh# of
the act, it was valid. And it was remarked by Savage,
C.J., who delivered the opinion of the court, that the
legislature did not, by the act, intend to prohibit as-
signment by corporations in all cases, but only in the
two instances designated: one, before involvency and in
anticipation or contemplation of that event; the other,
after insolvency, to officers or stockholders for the
payment of any debt.
In the case of Harris v Thompson 15 Barb. 62,.Vhich
came before the Supreme Court of this State,in 1853,thecourt
in construing the language of the fourth section of the
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fourth title of the Revised Statutes, reenacting the pro-
vision of the act of 1825, held that the second clause of
that section, which declares it to be unlawful "to make
any transfer or assignment in contemplation of the in-
solvency of such company, to any person or persons what-
ever," was not, like the first clause, confined in its
application to assignments by incorporated companies who
had "refused the payment of any of their notes or other
evidences of debt in specie or lawful money of the United
States," but applied to all assignments and tnansfers by
corporations, in contemplation of insolvency, to any
person or persons whatever, and they accordingly held
that an assignment by a manufacturing company, of all its
property to a trustee, in trust for the payment of its
creditors ratably, made in contemplation of insolvency,
was absolutely void by statute. And the position taken by
the court in this case has been approved by the court of
appeals in several cases.
In Robinson v Bank of Attica 21 New York 406 it
was held that an act in contemplation of existing insolv-
ency was as much within the statute as one done in antici-
pation of future insolvency. This may be taken, therefore
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as the true construction of the statute; but an act in
either case must be in anticipation or in view of that
condition. In other words, the act must have been done
because of existing or anticipated insolvency, or else it
is not prohibited. It is not enough that inaolvency and
the act co-exist.
It was held in Dutcher v Importers and Traders
Bank 59 New York 5, that the payment in the usual course
of business, although bp an insolvent corporation, was
not prohibited nor a sale so made, and as the evidence
tended to show that the payment objected to would have
been made in the same way had the paying bank been entire-
ly solvent the judgement directed by the trial judge, on
the ground that actual insolvency was conclusive evidence
of the intent or purpose of payment, was reversed.
This case was followed and approved by Paulding v
Chrome Steel Co. 94 New York 334. Holding that the act
must be done because of existing or anticipated insolven-
cy, or else it is not prohibited.
-25-
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This act, however was made inapplicable to literary or
religious corporations. In 1830 the above was made a part
of the revised statutes, part 1, chap. 18, title 4, see.,
4, by which the provision was also made inapplicable to
moneyed corporations; so that, down to 1882 a corporation
other than a religious or moneyed corporation could not
make a general assignment in this state: 3 R.S., 8th Ed.,
J. 1731, qec. 11. In 1882,by a curious tape, in legis-
lation,the provision was done away with: Laws of 1882,
Chap. 402, qec. 1, part 39; but in the same year the pro-
vision prohibiting preferences by moneyed corporations
and transfers without resolution of the directors was re-
enacted in the Banking Law of 1882, Chap.409, qec. 187.
In 1884 the original provision prohibiting assignments by
insolvent corporatiors or in contemplation of insolvency
was restored: Laws of 1884, Chap. 434.
The result is that down to 1890, with the excep-
tion of the yearsl882 to 1884, a corporation could not
make a general assignment for the benefit of creditors
when insolvent or in contemplation of insolvency unless
it was a moneyed or religious corporation; a moneyed
corporation might make a general assigunent to a person
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not connected with it provided no preferences were given
and if the property was worth over $1,000 and the assign-
ment was authorized by resolution of director's.
In the important case of Curtis v Leavitt 15 New
York 9, the construction of this section of the statute
was made the subject of much discussion. It was held by
theee of the judges who delivered opinions,that the lang-
uage of the statute must be strictly pursued, and that
there must actually be a formal resolution of the board
of directors, adopted previous to the transfer and ex"
pressly authorizing it,. It was maintained on the other
hand , by two of the judges, that it was sufficient if
the requisition of the statute be substantially complied
with, that the transfer might be approved at the time or
ratified afterwards, and that the ratification need not
be declared in express terns. The conclusion finally
arrived at by the court seems to have been that the trans-
fers in the case before the court were void, as not being
authorized by a previous resolution; but that the purchas-
ers and pledgers of the companys bonds secured by such
transfers, were "purchasers for a valuable consideration
and without notice," and therefore within the saving
-28-
clause of the eighth section already cited.
It was further held in the case just cited, in
accordance with previous decisions in this state, that
banking associations, organized under the general banking
law of 1838, are corporations, and therefor within the
provisions of the Revised statutes relating to moneyed
corporations.
Chap. 18 of the general laws and the provisions of
the laws of 1882 above mentioned are now repealed and in
their place has been enacted Sec. 48 of Chap. 36, Stock
Corporation Law, as finally passed in the laws of 1892,
Chap. 688: 5th R.S. (quf. 8th Ed.), p. 4102, 7ec 48.
This provision does not include a prohibition against
general assignment by corporations to disinterested par-
ties but prohibits preferences. The doing away of this
prohibition is an act of justice to corporations, which
prior to this were obliged to accept some person to hold
their property who although he might be favored by the
court might be very undesirable to the members of the
corporation. But the restrictions above mentioned never
applied to foreign corporations.
-29-
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